Individual differences in negatively-biased credulity:

Fessler, D.M.T. (2019) Believing Chicken Little: Evolutionaryperspectives on credulity and danger

"Although negatively-biased credulity is thought to be a species-typical trait of human cognition, nevertheless, individual variation in this trait is plainly evident. A collection of related features underlie such variation. First, the costs and benefits of negatively-biased credulity importantly hinge on the probability that a previously unfamiliar hazard described in a given message does, in fact, exist. One factor shaping individuals’ estimations of this probability is the frequency of other hazards. This is because hazards often co-occur. For example, if an ecosystem harbors one species of, say, dangerous predator, or lethal mushroom, it often harbors others as well (Andheria, Karanth, & Kumar, 2007; Cai, Cui, & Yang, 2016); likewise, a neighborhood blighted by petty crime will frequently suffer from a variety of more serious crimes as well (Perkins, Wandersman, Rich, & Taylor, 1993). Accordingly, individuals living in dangerous environments will often benefit from enhanced negatively-biased credulity, as the presence of multiple known hazards increases the probability that a message purportedly describing a previously unknown hazard is accurate.

Second, because, independent of issues of danger, people evaluate the plausibility of new information against the backdrop of their existing knowledge such that messages that are consistent with prior understanding are viewed as more plausible than those that are inconsistent with previous knowledge (White, Pahl, Buehner, & Haye, 2003b). This offers another pathway whereby beliefs regarding the frequency of hazards should influence assessments of statements purporting to describe previously unknown hazards – whether the individual’s environment is objectively dangerous or not, those who believe their environment to be dangerous should find new information about hazards more congruent with their prior knowledge, and thus more plausible. 

Third, due to differences in physical and social resources, people differ in their ability to weather encounters with hazards. As a result, the threat posed by a given source of danger will often vary across individuals, with corresponding consequences for the utility of negatively-biased credulity. Lastly, driven by variation in personality (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000) that may in part be evolutionarily maintained through frequencydependent selection (Dall, Houston, & McNamara, 2004) and may in part result from differing adaptive developmental trajectories (Wang, Kruger, & Wilke, 2009), people differ in their willingness to take risks with their safety; correspondingly, features of personality correlate with the extent to which the world is perceived as dangerous (Dallago, Mirisola, & Roccato, 2012), and, together, these features likely drive enhanced negatively-biased credulity.

To summarize the above, people can be expected to vary in their perceptions of the frequency of hazards in their environment and their willingness to confront them, and this variation should influence the propensity for negatively-biased credulity. Paralleling this prediction, as both a trait and a state, anxiety is associated with the tendency to acquire and transmit rumors (Anthony, 1992; Bangerter & Heath, 2004; Pezzo & Beckstead, 2006; Rosnow, 1980; Rosnow, Esposito, & Gibney, 1988; Walker & Beckerle, 1987). More specifically, concern about threats enhances susceptibility to rumors about imminent hazards (Greenhill & Oppenheim, 2017). Against this backdrop, directly testing the aforementioned prediction, Fessler, Pisor, and Navarrete (2014) found that the degree to which participants evinced negatively-biased credulity correlated with their responses on a three-item survey assessing generalized belief in a dangerous world (e.g., “The world is a dangerous place,” etc.)."

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"Correspondingly, and critical for the present purposes, conservatives tend to see the world as more dangerous than do liberals (Federico, Hunt, & Ergun, 2009). ... [To] the extent that (social) liberalism embraces cultural pluralism and innovation, the reshaping of social structures, and the revamping of institutions, it constitutes a strategy of experimentation rather than maintenance. Existing practices have, by definition, passed the test of time, including weathering any dangers that confronted society and its members in the past. Experimentation necessarily entails the risk of failure, and both the likelihood of failure and the costs of failure escalate as the level of danger confronting a group increases. Accordingly, conservatism will generally be the better strategy in a dangerous world, while liberalism will be more effective in a safe world."

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"Biases to pursue information about hazards; believe information about hazards; elevate the stature of those who provide information about hazards; and transmit to others information about hazards should, aggregated over time and numerous information transmission events, create an imbalance wherein information about hazards is more common than information about benefits."

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