Superstitious Beliefs:

According to Peter Hofstätter, some people suffer from a certain incapacity to accept the concept of randomness.

20Q:

http://20q.net/

"... language evolved precisely to enable us to communicate about the nonpresent - events that do not take place in the here and now."

Michael C. Corballis

Remembering the past to imagine the future: the prospective brain

Remembering the past to imagine the future: the prospective brain
Daniel L. Schacter, Donna Rose Addis and Randy L. Buckner (2007)


Abstract

A rapidly growing number of recent studies show that imagining the future depends on much of the same neural machinery that is needed for remembering the past. These findings have led to the concept of the prospective brain; an idea that a crucial function of the brain is to use stored information to imagine, simulate and predict possible future events. We suggest that processes such as memory can be productively re-conceptualized in light of this idea.

"Given the adaptive priority of future planning, we find it helpful to think of the brain as a fundamentally prospective organ that is designed to use information from the past and the present to generate predictions about the future. Memory can be thought of as a tool used by the prospective brain to generate simulations of possible future events."

Discrete Coding of Reward Probability and Uncertainty by Dopamine Neurons

Discrete Coding of Reward Probability and Uncertainty by Dopamine Neurons
Christopher D. Fiorillo, Philippe N. Tobler, Wolfram Schultz (2003)


Abstract

Uncertainty is critical in the measure of information and in assessing the accuracy of predictions. It is determined by probability P, being maximal at P 0.5 and decreasing at higher and lower probabilities. Using distinct stimuli to indicate the probability of reward, we found that the phasic activation of dopamine neurons varied monotonically across the full range of probabilities, supporting past claims that this response codes the discrepancy between predicted and actual reward. In contrast, a previously unobserved response covaried with uncertainty and consisted of a gradual increase in activity until the potential time of reward. The coding of uncertainty suggests a possible role for dopamine signals in attention-based learning and risk-taking behavior.

"The brain continuously makes predictions and compares outcomes (or inputs) with those predictions. Predictions are fundamentally concerned with the probability that an event will occur within a specified time period. It is only through a rich representation of probabilities that an animal can infer the structure of its environment and form associations between correlated events."

Dopamine Enhances Expectation of Pleasure in Humans

Dopamine Enhances Expectation of Pleasure in Humans
Tali Sharot, Tamara Shiner, Annemarie C. Brown, Judy Fan, and Raymond J. Dolan (2009)


Abstract

Human action is strongly influenced by expectations of pleasure. Making decisions, ranging from which products to buy to which job offer to accept, requires an estimation of how good (or bad) the likely outcomes will make us feel. Yet, little is known about the biological basis of subjective estimations of future hedonic reactions. Here, we show that administration of a drug that enhances dopaminergic function (dihydroxy-L-phenylalanine; L-DOPA) during the imaginative construction of positive future life events subsequently enhances estimates of the hedonic pleasure to be derived from these same events. These findings provide the first direct evidence for the role of dopamine in the modulation of subjective hedonic expectations in humans.

Dopaminergic systems expansion and the advent of Homo erectus

Dopaminergic systems expansion and the advent of Homo erectus

Alicia M. DeLouize, Frederick L. Coolidge, Thomas Wynn (2016)

Abstract

It is well accepted that a grade shift occurred in hominin evolution approximately 1.9 million years ago with the appearance of Homo erectus. With the challenges of complete terrestrial life, new cognitive abilities were selected for that allowed this species to thrive for the next million and a half years. It has also long been recognized that there was a change in diet with the advent of Homo erectus, that is, a greater reliance on meat. However, the relationship between additional meat and the cognitive abilities of Homo erectus has mostly remained unclear. The present paper proposes that an increase in dietary meat protein and fats may have led to an increase in dopamine and dopaminergic systems, a critical chemical neurotransmitter in the brain. This purported change in dopaminergic systems may have played a key role in many of the traits and abilities exhibited by Homo erectus at that time, including increases in body and brain size, dispersion, and a greater aptitude for spatial and social cognitions.

Bipedality and hair loss in human evolution revisited: The impact of altitude and activity scheduling

Bipedality and hair loss in human evolution revisited: The impact of altitude and activity scheduling
Tamas David-Barrett, Robin IM Dunbar; (2016)


Abstract

Bipedality evolved early in hominin evolution, and at some point was associated with hair loss over most of the body. One classic explanation (Wheeler 1984: J. Hum. Evol. 13, 91–98) was that these traits evolved to reduce heat overload when australopiths were foraging in more open tropical habitats where they were exposed to the direct effects of sunlight at midday. A recent critique of this model (Ruxton & Wilkinson 2011a: Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 20965-20969) argued that it ignored the endogenous costs of heat generated by locomotion, and concluded that only hair loss provided a significant reduction in heat load. We add two crucial corrections to this model (the altitude at which australopiths actually lived and activity scheduling) and show that when these are included there are substantial reductions in heat load for bipedal locomotion even for furred animals. In addition, we add one further consideration to the model: we extend the analysis across the full 24 h day, and show that fur loss could not have evolved until much later because of the thermoregulatory costs this would have incurred at the altitudes where australopiths actually lived. Fur loss is most likely associated with the exploitation of open habitats at much lower altitudes at a much later date by the genus Homo.

Gender differences in interpersonal accuracy

Gender differences in interpersonal accuracy
Judith A. Hall, Sarah D. Gunnery, Terrence G. Hogan (2016)
The Social Psychology of Perceiving Others Accurately

Abstract

This chapter reviews several traditions of research and theory on gender differences in interpersonal accuracy. Females excel over males in inferring the meanings of affective cues as judged in multiple cue modalities. This difference holds across time, cultures, age groups, and target gender. Females also have greater ability in judging personality, though fewer studies are available. They also excel in remembering others' appearance and nonverbal behavior, they respond more quickly on accuracy tasks, and they have more extensive knowledge of the meanings and usages of nonverbal communication as assessed on a written test. However, little difference in judgment accuracy is seen for lie detection and the judgment of status/dominance, and for the judgment of physical pain there is evidence that males excel over females. Accuracy in other domains is also discussed, including the recognition of flirtation and romantic interest. Finally, the chapter reviews the main theoretical frameworks within which accuracy gender differences have been discussed.

Time Horizons:

According to Thomas Suddendorf, the time horizons of humans and all other known animals aren't just gradually, but qualitatively different. There is a wide gap between human and non-human time horizons and it seems that thoughts about the distant future (e.g. the coming decades) are exclusively present in the human mind.

[See also: http://meinnaturwissenschaftsblog.blogspot.co.at/2016/03/mental-time-travel-continuities-and.html]

"The human mind has evolved to wander, not only back and forth in time, but also into imaginary worlds, and into the minds of others. The extent to which this facility occurs in other species remains unknown, although it seems likely that the mind-wandering of humans is considerably more flexible than that of even our closest nonhuman relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos. One reason to suppose that this is so is that language appears to have evolved to allow us to share our mind-wanderings, and there is so far little evidence that anything resembling language exists in other species—at least with respect to its generativity and infinite range of expression. It is of course conceivable that chimpanzees have rich mental lives but lack the means to express their mental wanderings. 

The neurological underpinnings of mind wandering is the default network, identified largely through brain imaging in humans, but seemingly anatomically present in monkeys (Vincent et al., 2007). It is likely that primates have at least some degree of internal processing, independent of external input, but that the default network underwent considerable elaboration in our Homo ancestors."

Michael C. Corballis (2012)

Mental time travel: continuities and discontinuities

Mental time travel: continuities and discontinuities
Thomas Suddendorf (2013)

"I do not think it is useful to resurrect Darwin’s blanket statement that differences in mind between humans and animals certainly are one of degree and not of kind. The picture is more complicated. Even when we find evidence for apparent differences in degree, this need not rule out that differences in kind are also entailed: as temperature gradually increases, the properties of H2O change in kind as it transforms from a solid, to a liquid, to a gas. By the same token, continuous increase in, say, working memory capacity, may well lead to discontinuous changes in what a mind can possibly conceive of. I see no reason why mental time travel should not have evolved gradually through Darwinian descent with modification. However, continuity over evolutionary time (e.g., from Australopithecines to Homo) should not be confused with a need to postulate an absence of gaps in the distribution of traits among extant species [9]. As transitional forms go extinct, vast qualitative differences can certainly emerge. On current evidence, it still appears that human mental time travel is profoundly special. There are few signs that animals act with the flexible foresight that is so characteristic of humans."

If You Work in a Creative Industry, You Should Steal Other People's Ideas

If You Work in a Creative Industry, You Should Steal Other People's Ideas
John Cleese (2016)

Just as Shakespeare lifted plots from his predecessors, young performers today ought to focus on emulating those artists they like most. That's not to say plagiarism is excusable; it's not. It just means that artists who are just getting started should seek to model themselves after those who have gone before.

Take it from John Cleese of Monty Python fame: "You say, 'I'm going to write something completely new and original and very funny.' You can't do it. It's like trying to fly a plane without having any lessons. You've got to start somewhere and the best way to start is by copying something that is really good."

Personality Disorders

Personality Disorders
C. Robert Cloninger, Dragan M. Svrakic (2016)


Abstract

Personality disorder (PD) is the primary psychiatric illness observed in most patients with psychosocial complaints, particularly young adults. PD is present in one-sixth of people in the general population and more than half of all psychiatric patients. Reliable diagnosis of PD can be made in routine clinical practice by brief assessment of two essential features of a person’s character—low self-directedness and low cooperativeness—that indicate reduced ability to work and to get along with other people. Subtypes can be distinguished in terms of configurations of temperament traits measuring a person’s emotional drives for immediate gratification. PD is usually a lifelong disorder but can mature (remit) spontaneously or with treatment. The temperament and character components of PD are all moderately heritable. Neurobiological findings about personality explain the benefit of differential pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy for different subtypes of PD. The treatment of PD often begins with a stabilization phase with medications and simple cognitive-behavioral approaches. Even in cases of severe PD, more advanced stages of therapy can lead to radical transformation of a person’s perspective on life leading to a healthy and stable state of well-being.

The intelligence and personality of Finland's Swedish-speaking minority

The intelligence and personality of Finland's Swedish-speaking minority
Edward Dutton, Dimitri Van der Linden, Guy Madison, Jan Antfolk, Michael A. Woodley of Menie

Personality & Individual Differences (July 2016)

Highlights

•

Finns have higher IQ than Finland-Swedes.

•

Finland-Swedes have higher GFP than Finns.

•

Finland-Swedes higher in Extraversion, Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability.

•

Jensen Effect on these differences; they are mostly on the GFP.

---

Abstract

There is evidence that Finland's Swedish-speaking minority (Finland-Swedes) may have a distinct intelligence–personality profile from the Finnish-speaking Finns (Finns). We test this through an examination of the two groups' PISA (Programme of International Student Assessment) scores (which assesses representative samples of 15 year olds from OECD countries) and their personality scores, drawing upon a representative Finnish sample. We found Finland-Swedes to have slightly lower average intelligence. However, when controlling for gender and age, the Finland-Swedes score significantly higher on Conscientiousness, Extraversion and Emotional Stability. Overall, we found a Jensen Effect whereby most of the personality differences between the two groups could be attributed to the General Factor of Personality (GFP), which reflects the shared variance of lower-order personality traits. The GFP is assumed to reflect general social effectiveness.

Evolution of Reporting P Values in the Biomedical Literature, 1990-2015

Evolution of Reporting P Values in the Biomedical Literature, 1990-2015
David Chavalarias; Joshua David Wallach; Alvin Ho Ting Li; John P. A. Ioannidis; (2016)

Importance  The use and misuse of P values has generated extensive debates.

Objective  To evaluate in large scale the P values reported in the abstracts and full text of biomedical research articles over the past 25 years and determine how frequently statistical information is presented in ways other than P values.

Design  Automated text-mining analysis was performed to extract data on P values reported in 12 821 790 MEDLINE abstracts and in 843 884 abstracts and full-text articles in PubMed Central (PMC) from 1990 to 2015. Reporting of P values in 151 English-language core clinical journals and specific article types as classified by PubMed also was evaluated. A random sample of 1000 MEDLINE abstracts was manually assessed for reporting of P values and other types of statistical information; of those abstracts reporting empirical data, 100 articles were also assessed in full text.

Main Outcomes and Measures  P values reported.

Results  Text mining identified 4 572 043 P values in 1 608 736 MEDLINE abstracts and 3 438 299 Pvalues in 385 393 PMC full-text articles. Reporting of P values in abstracts increased from 7.3% in 1990 to 15.6% in 2014. In 2014, P values were reported in 33.0% of abstracts from the 151 core clinical journals (n = 29 725 abstracts), 35.7% of meta-analyses (n = 5620), 38.9% of clinical trials (n = 4624), 54.8% of randomized controlled trials (n = 13 544), and 2.4% of reviews (n = 71 529). The distribution of reported Pvalues in abstracts and in full text showed strong clustering at P values of .05 and of .001 or smaller. Over time, the “best” (most statistically significant) reported P values were modestly smaller and the “worst” (least statistically significant) reported P values became modestly less significant. Among the MEDLINE abstracts and PMC full-text articles with P values, 96% reported at least 1 P value of .05 or lower, with the proportion remaining steady over time in PMC full-text articles. In 1000 abstracts that were manually reviewed, 796 were from articles reporting empirical data; P values were reported in 15.7% (125/796 [95% CI, 13.2%-18.4%]) of abstracts, confidence intervals in 2.3% (18/796 [95% CI, 1.3%-3.6%]), Bayes factors in 0% (0/796 [95% CI, 0%-0.5%]), effect sizes in 13.9% (111/796 [95% CI, 11.6%-16.5%]), other information that could lead to estimation of P values in 12.4% (99/796 [95% CI, 10.2%-14.9%]), and qualitative statements about significance in 18.1% (181/1000 [95% CI, 15.8%-20.6%]); only 1.8% (14/796 [95% CI, 1.0%-2.9%]) of abstracts reported at least 1 effect size and at least 1 confidence interval. Among 99 manually extracted full-text articles with data, 55 reported P values, 4 presented confidence intervals for all reported effect sizes, none used Bayesian methods, 1 used false-discovery rates, 3 used sample size/power calculations, and 5 specified the primary outcome.

Conclusions and Relevance  In this analysis of P values reported in MEDLINE abstracts and in PMC articles from 1990-2015, more MEDLINE abstracts and articles reported P values over time, almost all abstracts and articles with P values reported statistically significant results, and, in a subgroup analysis, few articles included confidence intervals, Bayes factors, or effect sizes. Rather than reporting isolated P values, articles should include effect sizes and uncertainty metrics.

Relationships between age of females and attraction to the Dark Triad personality

Relationships between age of females and attraction to the Dark Triad personality

• Corinne Qureshi, 
• Elizabeth Harris, 
• Breanna E. Atkinson (2016)
• 
  

Highlights

•

Designed characters high and low on the Dark Triad

•

Measured attractiveness ratings of these characters

•

Compared younger and older women's attractiveness ratings

•

Younger women are more attracted than older women to high Dark Triad character

•

Older women more attracted to low than to high Dark Triad character

---

Abstract

The current study extended previous literature that had investigated the attractiveness of the Dark Triad (DT) personality to youthful women (Carter, Campbell, & Muncer, 2014), by comparing responses between two age groups. Participants (N = 1001 females) consisted of undergraduate students and women sampled from various North American communities. Participants read descriptions of male personalities and rated their attractiveness. Descriptions of male characters were designed to portray a combination of high scores on the Dark Triad traits (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and sub-clinical psychopathy), and results were compared to ratings on a low-scoring DT personality. Results were generally supportive of the hypotheses, such that younger women were more attracted to the Dark Triad traits than were older women; older women also rated the low-scoring DT personality as significantly more attractive than did younger women. However, inconsistent with previous literature, younger women rated the low-scoring DT personality as significantly more favorable than the high-scoring DT personality. Further, the participants' level of fertility did not significantly influence attractiveness ratings. The current study's findings may deepen understanding of the ways in which mating strategies change with age, as well as the qualities that women desire in a mate, in order to improve mating success.

[See also: Chimp digit span]

Survey of Expert Opinion on Intelligence: Causes of International Differences in Cognitive Ability Tests

Survey of Expert Opinion on Intelligence: Causes of International Differences in Cognitive Ability Tests (pdf)
Heiner Rindermann, David Becker & Thomas R. Coyle (2016)


Abstract

Following Snyderman and Rothman (1987, 1988), we surveyed expert opinions on the current state of intelligence research. This report examines expert opinions on causes of international differences in student assessment and psychometric IQ test results. Experts were surveyed about the importance of culture, genes, education (quantity and quality), wealth, health, geography, climate, politics, modernization, sampling error, test knowledge, discrimination, test bias, and migration. The importance of these factors was evaluated for diverse countries, regions, and groups including Finland, East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Europe, the Arabian-Muslim world, Latin America, Israel, Jews in the West, Roma (gypsies), and Muslim immigrants. Education was rated by N=71 experts as the most important cause of international ability differences. Genes were rated as the second most relevant factor but also had the highest variability in ratings. Culture, health, wealth, modernization, and politics were the next most important factors, whereas other factors such as geography, climate, test bias, and sampling error were less important. The paper concludes with a discussion of limitations of the survey (e.g., response rates and validity of expert opinions).

Raymond B. Cattell on Creativity:

"... the correlation of creativity with introversion and with self-sentiment and superego standards. For what characterizes a society which is adjusting to complexity is probably an increase in introversion, and certainly an increase in superego control (possibly, as Freudians assert, at some cost in terms of neurosis). Unfortunately, prior to the location of extraversion as a unique second-order factor, psychologists were as loose as the general public in confusing extraversion with other things. One suspects that the educational psychologists of the “progressive” movement of the 1920s in England and the corresponding popular view in North and South America (exclusive of Canada) confused “healthy adjustment” with “extraversion.” Regardless of whether this impulsive ex via appears in New York or the western frontier, there is every indication that it is antipathetic to true creativity, and the fact that it has been held up as a norm and an ideal in school is not unconnected with the present belated search for a lost creativity.

Creativeness must come from the individual, but it is the task of society to produce the climate in which introversion and restraint are viable styles of life."

Source:

INTELLIGENCE : ITS STRUCTURE, GROWTH AND ACTION

Raymond B. Cattell (1987) p 514-515

Raymond B. Cattell about Creativity:

INTELLIGENCE : ITS STRUCTURE, GROWTH AND ACTION
Raymond B. Cattell (1987) p 499-504


1. Some myths and facts about genius

“Creativity” became an educationally more fashionable term in the 1960s. Teachers began to revolt against making measured examination grades the criteria of educational success. In sophisticated circles originality and creativity have always been revered. But it has also been recognized that defining true creativity, in art, science, and other realms, as distinct from more waywardness, has been a fundamental difficulty. The genius and the oddity have too frequently been confused.

Because what is newly created is strange, folklore has connected genius with oddity. Any new, successful biological variant - such as a hairless ape - is also strange, but it may be perfectly normal, if by normal we mean healthy and effective. On the other hand it is probably true of cultural variations as of biological mutations, that only about one in a thousand is an improvement on the status quo, and the rest are unhealthy misfits, quickly to be eliminated in the course of nature, If by a genius we mean someone who produces a better remedy against disease, or a better play, then a genius may seem unconventional. But “bohemianism” is a poor indication of genius. Nevertheless, love of the occult continues to favor a belief in the transcendental strangeness of genius. Socrates may have begun it, when he convinced the young that he possessed a “demon” and went into trances therewith. Aristotle claimed that “men illustrious in poetry, politics, and the arts have often been melancholic and mad.” Such views descending through Roman times (Seneca), and epitomized in Dryden’s oft-quoted couplet :

Great wits are sure to madness near allied 

And thin partitions do their bounds divide

linger also, as speculation, in more recent writings on genius by Havelock Ellis, Galton, Lombroso, Hirsch, Kretschmer, and many others. One is forced to repeat that much of this identification springs from the ever-blooming logical fallacy that if genius is odd, oddity is genius. Careful biographical research does not support this contention ; the genius may be neurotic, partly because of the stress of his loneliness or rejection;’ but the incidence of mental ill health and psychosis is actually below normal in the ranks of the creators.

The variety of ideas about the causes of creativity in genius are endless, ranging from Moorman’s (1940) theory of germ stimulation by tuberculosis (Voltaire, R. L. Stevenson, Bashkirtseff, Keats, Shelley, Sidney Lanier, Hood, Bessemer, Schiller, and others), to Lombroso’s “equivalent to crime,” to Kretschmer’s “warring heredities,” to Adler’s overcompensation for inferiority, and even to Freud’s “evasion of reality.”

The modern and quantitative study of genius can be said to begin with Galton (1870), who stressed the centrality of sheer g, and demonstrated the substantial hereditary connections of that g. Havelock Ellis may be said to have added the importance of temperament, in his finding from statistical analyses in the National Portrait Gallery (unfortunately not since followed up) that in Britain the Nordic strain (Newton, Kelvin, Edison, Rutherford) expressed itself in mathematics and science, and the Celtic strain (dark-eyed and haired) in religion, history, and verbalsocial skills. Kretschmer (1931) followed Nietzsche (“Where is the madness with which you should be inoculated?”) and the Greeks in believing that there must be some element of the fanatic in genius. He stressed hybridization of talented races, and, (as followed up later by Sheldon) the importance of temperament, rooted in body build, in deciding the direction of expression, here reaching views essentially consistent with those of Havelock Ellis.

More careful documentation followed, in this tradition, in the work of Cox and Terman (1926), who studied 301 men of genius from the past, and then in Terman (1925) who began that monumental follow-up of children actually selected by intelligence tests to lie within the top 1 % of the ability range. The former study fully confirmed the general emphasis by Galton on high absolute magnitude of general intelligence in geniuses. When rated by independent judges operating on childhood biographical data, 84% of the 301 geniuses received, by modern I.Q. standards (sigma = 15 to 16), I.Q.’s of 120 or more, and 21 % of 150 or more. Additionally, Catherine Cox (1926, Vol. 2, p. 218) called attention to the pervasive frequency of “persistence of motive and effort, confidence in their abilities and great strength or force of character,” which Galton has also commented on as “great energy and zeal.”

From there, the chief developments have been studies on living subjects : (a) of abilities other than general intelligence, by Guilford, Merrifield, and a group of able associates (1961); (b) of the criterion of creative performance in life, by Calvin Taylor and his associates (1963), Barron (1963) and others; and (c) of personality and motivation, in terms of modern, measurable dimensions by Cattell and Drevdahl (1955), Cox (1926), Drevdahl and Cattell (1939, Jones (1959), Sprecher (1959) and others. The second of these lines of research is vitally necessary, for until we know how the actual criteria correlate we do not know whether we are trying to predict one thing or several. Taylor’s work shows definitely that among scientists in industry the publication of research articles, the number of patents obtained, etc., are different from and little correlated with the evaluation by peers and supervisors. The personality analyses (in this field and by Lowell Kelly in medical research) give a clue to this discrepancy between criteria, because they show that creative persons are apt to be unpopular. Incidentally, finding firm criteria is the toughest part of this area of research. It is not an intellectually defensible escape from this problem of an objective criterion of creativity to say it cannot be documented and must rest on ratings. For “ratings” are merely personal opinions, changing with the cultural affiliations, intelligence, etc., of the rater.

This issue also affects the approach to creativity by measures other than intelligence. Guilford and his co-workers who have gone to abilities beyond intelligence, nevertheless have defined creativity in the test performance itself, instead of by some life criterion through which the designation of a test as a “creativity” measure could be validated. The result is that the verdict that a test measures creativity is only a projection of the test constructor’s personal view about what creativity is. Thus in the intellectual tests designed by Guilford’s students, and many others who have worked on creativity in this decade, creativity has finished up by being evaluated simply as oddity or bizarreness of response relative to the population mean or as output of words per minute, etc. This indeed comes close to mistaking the shadow for the substance. Mere unusualness, without adaptive value, is, as Eysenck shows (1957) actually a good measure of psychopathy or neuroticism, not creativity. Again one must repeat that many creative products are odd ; but oddity is not creativity. For some, additional, vital condition must be met by the latter.

Of course, in the last resort, a similar charge of circularity could be brought also with regard to intelligence, if Galton, Terman, and others had not located their geniuses first and afterward evaluated their intelligence. Terman found, as we have seen, that geniuses of the past, vindicated by history, were generally of exceptionally high intelligence. But this makes intelligence only a necessary, not a sufficient condition. It was only when Terman came to his study of living children of high intelligence and allowed it to be called a study of genius that a doubtful logical assumption crept in. A writer can be the victim of his readers, and in this case perhaps the mistake is in assuming that Terman intended that the label “genius” apply to these bright individuals before later life performances had confirmed their status. Another instance of this dictatorship of the follower may’ have occurred in the followers of Guilford, whose emphasis on abilities other than intelligence has become for the moment the popular view that intelligence is unnecessary! It remains true, as Burt (1967), Butcher (1969), Thorndike (1943), and Vernon (1960) have reminded neophytes in the field, that general intelligence is still the main essential ability (apart from personality traits) and that the one, sure, common feature of many and varied tests of creativity is their high “g” saturation. As Burt has pointed out : “the new tests for creativity would form very satisfactory additions to any ordinary battery for testing the general factor of intelligence.”

2. Some ability and personality associates of high creativity

If, as suggested above, we stand by actual 1ife performance (rather than performance in a two-hour test of artificial “creativity measures”) as the necessary criterion, then - after intelligence - the most important determiners are unquestionably personality factors. Biographical studies by Roe (1953), Barron (1963), the present writer (1963b) and especially Drevdahl and Cattell (1958) agree with the view inherent in Havelock Ellis, Kretschmer, Terman, Galton, and other shrewd observers that the creative person does possess, over and above intelligence, some very characteristic personality qualities. These may or may not be considered healthy, normal qualities - this is often a matter of values - but the psychologist today can at least analyze them as meaningful source traits which point to clear theories of causal action.

Without space to present separately the profiles from the various personality factor surveys of highly creative people in physical science, biology, psychology, art, and literature (see Cattell and Drevdahl, 1955 ; Drevdahl and Cattell, 1958) - which, incidentally, agree amazingly well, considering the diversity of interest of the groups - we present in fig. 13.1 the composite, central profile found. Its greatest deviations from the average are (apart from intelligence) on high self-sufficiency, introversion, dominance, and desurgency.

The selection of outstandingly creative individuals was made in these cases by committees of peers, and is thus, in essence, the same as, say, a Nobel prize selection procedure. It differs from direct personality rating in that is is made with documents and productions. In the case of the common (three area) scientist’s profile the raters also were asked to contrast their choices with choices of equally academically distinguished men (administrators and teachers) not creatively gifted. Since abbreviated discussion most easily proceeds with the broader second-stratum level of personality factors (though the more accurate prediction and understanding rest on the primaries), we may point out that at a rough glance these people would be described as introverts (second-order Factor I). They also show high self-sufficiency and dominance in the primaries. Both the intensive biographical researches of Anne Roe (1953) and the more discursive biographical survey by the present writer (1963b) strongly support the main conclusions of these systematic test results. Cavendish hiding from society in a remote wing of his mansion, Newton forever wandering on “strange seas of thought, alone,” Einstein remote in the patent office library, Darwin taking his solitary walks in the woods? at Down - these are the epitome of the way of life of the creative person. If this introversion and intensity is the essence, it is easy to see why a committedly extravert, impulsive and casual society has had to begin frantically chasing - and vulgarizing - creativity over the last decade.

In this latter connection let us note that acceptance of the idea that measures of fluency are measures of a creative ability has led to generalizations to the effect that the temperamental and personality associations of fluency are conditions of creativity. Thus, inferences drawn from the empirical research of Getzels and Jackson (1962), for example, (who used certain tests from the Objective-Analytic Personality Factor Battery, but not enough to measure any one factor) and the theorizing of Maslow (1954), have led to the picture of the creative person as an incontinent, unrestrained, over-self-expressive individual. In the latter's descriptions of the self-actualizing personality, one scarcely can escape the impression that, without some daily assault upon convention, such a personality feels futile. ...


[See also: Giftedness and Genius: Crucial Differences; John Cleese on Creativity;]

Prevalence of diagnosed diabetes among individuals aged one year and older, by age group and sex, Canada, 2008/09

[Source]

"In 2012, among civilian, noninstitutionalized US adults, approximately half (49.8%, 117 million) had at least 1 of 10 selected chronic conditions. More specifically, 24.3% had 1 chronic condition, 13.8% had 2 conditions, and 11.7% had 3 or more conditions (Table). Among adults with at least 1 chronic condition, more than half (approximately 60 million) had multiple chronic conditions."

[Source]

Approach/Avoidance

Approach/Avoidance // Neuroimaging Personality, Social Cognition, and Character
Neil McNaughton, Colin G. DeYoung, Philip J. Corr (2016)

Patent applications to the EPO, by NUTS level 3 region, 2011 (per million inhabitants)

Source:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Research_and_innovation_statistics_at_regional_level

Prevalence of Mental Illness in the United States: Data Sources and Estimates

Prevalence of Mental Illness in the United States: Data Sources and Estimates
Erin Bagalman, Angela Napili; (2015)


Summary

Determining how many people have a mental illness can be difficult, and prevalence estimates vary. While numerous surveys include questions related to mental illness, few provide prevalence estimates of diagnosable mental illness (e.g., major depressive disorder as opposed to feeling depressed, or generalized anxiety disorder as opposed to feeling anxious), and fewer still provide national prevalence estimates of diagnosable mental illness. This report briefly describes the methodology and results of three large surveys (funded in whole or in part by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) that provide national prevalence estimates of diagnosable mental illness: the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R), the National Comorbidity Survey Replication Adolescent Supplement (NCS-A), and the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). The NCS-R and the NCS-A have the advantage of identifying specific mental illnesses, but they are more than a decade old. The NSDUH does not identify specific mental illnesses, but it has the advantage of being conducted annually.

Between February 2001 and April 2003, NCS-R staff interviewed more than 9,000 adults aged 18 or older. Analyses of NCS-R data have yielded different prevalence estimates. One analysis of NCS-R data estimated that 26.2% of adults had a mental illness within a 12-month period (hereinafter called 12-month prevalence). Another analysis of NCS-R data estimated the 12- month prevalence of mental illness to be 32.4% among adults. A third analysis of NCS-R data estimated the 12-month prevalence of mental illness excluding substance use disorders to be 24.8% among adults. The 12-month prevalence of serious mental illness was estimated to be 5.8% among adults, based on NCS-R data.

Between February 2001 and January 2004, NCS-A staff interviewed more than 10,000 adolescents aged 13 to 17. Using NCS-A data, researchers estimated the 12-month prevalence of mental illness to be 40.3% among adolescents. Some have suggested that the current approach to diagnosing mental illness identifies people who should not be considered mentally ill. The 12- month prevalence of serious mental illness was estimated to be 8.0% among adolescents, based on NCS-A data.

The NSDUH is an annual survey of approximately 70,000 adults and adolescents aged 12 years or older in the United States. According to the 2013 NSDUH, the estimated 12-month prevalence of mental illness excluding substance use disorders was 18.5% among adults aged 18 or older. The estimated 12-month prevalence of serious mental illness (excluding substance use disorders) was 4.2% among adults. Although the NSDUH collects information related to mental illness (e.g., symptoms of depression) from adolescents aged 12 to 17, it does not produce estimates of mental illness for that population.

The prevalence estimates discussed in this report may raise questions for Congress. Should federal mental health policy focus on adults or adolescents with any mental illness (including some whose mental illnesses may be mild and even transient) or on those with serious mental illness? Should substance use disorders be addressed through the same policies as other mental illnesses? Members of Congress may approach mental health policy differently depending in part on how they answer such questions. 

Intelligence in early adulthood and subsequent hospitalisation and admission rates for the whole range of mental disorders: longitudinal study of 1,049,663 men

Intelligence in early adulthood and subsequent hospitalisation and admission rates for the whole range of mental disorders: longitudinal study of 1,049,663 men
Catharine R. Gale, G. David Batty, Per Tynelius, Ian J. Deary, and Finn Rasmussen (2014)

Abstract

Background

Lower intelligence is a risk factor for several specific mental disorders, but it is unclear whether it is a risk factor for all mental disorder or whether it is associated with illness severity. We examined the relation between pre-morbid intelligence and risk of hospital admission and total admission rates for the whole range of mental disorders.

Methods

Participants were 1,049,663 Swedish men who took tests of intelligence on conscription into military service and were followed up for hospital admissions for mental disorder for a mean of 22.6 years. International Classification of Diseases diagnoses were recorded at discharge from hospital.

Results

Risk of hospital admission for all categories of disorder rose with each point decrease in the nine-point IQ score. For a standard deviation decrease in IQ, age-adjusted hazard ratios (95% CI) were 1.60 (1.55, 1.65) for schizophrenia, 1.49 (1.45, 1.53) for other non-affective psychoses, 1.50 (1.47, 1.51) for mood disorders, 1.51 (1.48, 1.54) for neurotic disorders, 1.60 (1.56, 1.64) for adjustment disorders, 1.75 (1.70, 1.80) for personality disorders, 1.75 (1.73, 1.77) for alcohol-related and 1.85 (1.82, 1.88) for other substance use disorders. Lower intelligence was associated with greater comorbidity. Associations changed little on adjustment for potential confounders. Men with lower intelligence had higher total admission rates, a possible marker of clinical severity.

Conclusions

Lower intelligence is a risk factor for the whole range of mental disorders and for illness severity. Understanding the underlying mechanisms is crucial if we are to find ways to reduce the burden of mental illness.

Childhood IQ and Adult Mental Disorders: A Test of the Cognitive Reserve Hypothesis

Childhood IQ and Adult Mental Disorders: A Test of the Cognitive Reserve Hypothesis
Karestan C. Koenen, Terrie E. Moffitt, Andrea L. Roberts, Laurie T. Martin, Laura Kubzansky, HonaLee Harrington, Richie Poulton, Avshalom Caspi; (2009)


Abstract

Objective: 

Cognitive reserve has been proposed as important in the etiology of neuropsychiatric disorders. However, tests of the association between premorbid IQ and adult mental disorders other than schizophrenia have been limited and inconclusive. The authors tested the hypothesis that low childhood IQ is associated with increased risk and severity of adult mental disorders. 

Method:

Participants were members of a representative 1972–1973 birth cohort of 1,037 males and females in Dunedin, New Zealand, who were followed up to age 32 with 96% retention. WISC-R IQ was assessed at ages 7, 9, and 11. Research diagnoses of DSM mental disorders were made at ages 18, 21, 26, and 32. 

Results: 

Lower childhood IQ was associated with increased risk of developing schizophrenia spectrum disorder, adult depression, and adult anxiety. Lower childhood IQ was also associated with greater comorbidity and with persistence of depression; the association with persistence of generalized anxiety disorder was nearly significant. Higher childhood IQ predicted increased risk of adult mania. 

Conclusions: 

Lower cognitive reserve, as reflected by childhood IQ, is an antecedent of several common psychiatric disorders and also predicts persistence and comorbidity. Thus, many patients who seek mental health treatment may have lower cognitive ability; this should be considered in prevention and treatment planning.

[See also: Is bipolar disorder more common in highly intelligent people? A cohort study of a million men, Catherine R. Gale et al, 2013]

Schizophrenia patients with high intelligence: A clinically distinct sub-type of schizophrenia?

Schizophrenia patients with high intelligence: A clinically distinct sub-type of schizophrenia?
E. Cernis, E. Vassos, G. Brebion, P.J. McKenna, R.M. Murray, A.S. David, J.H. MacCabe; (2015)


Abstract

Background: 

Schizophrenia patients are typically found to have low IQ both pre- and post-onset, in comparison to the general population. However, a subgroup of patients displays above average IQ pre-onset. The nature of these patients’ illness and its relationship to typical schizophrenia is not well understood. The current study sought to investigate the symptom profile of high-IQ schizophrenia patients. 

Methods: 

We identified 29 schizophrenia patients of exceptionally high pre-morbid intelligence (mean estimated pre-morbid intelligence quotient (IQ) of 120), of whom around half also showed minimal decline (less than 10 IQ points) from their estimated pre-morbid IQ. We compared their symptom scores (SAPS, SANS, OPCRIT, MADRS, GAF, SAI-E) with a comparison group of schizophrenia patients of typical IQ using multinomial logistic regression. 

Results: 

The patients with very high pre-morbid IQ had significantly lower scores on negative and disorganised symptoms than typical patients (RRR = 0.019; 95% CI = 0.001, 0.675, P = 0.030), and showed better global functioning and insight (RRR = 1.082; 95% CI = 1.020, 1.148; P = 0.009). Those with a minimal post-onset IQ decline also showed higher levels of manic symptoms (RRR = 8.213; 95% CI = 1.042, 64.750, P = 0.046). 

Conclusions: 

These findings provide evidence for the existence of a high-IQ variant of schizophrenia that is associated with markedly fewer negative symptoms than typical schizophrenia, and lends support to the idea of a psychosis spectrum or continuum over boundaried diagnostic categories.

"A man who dares to waste one hour of time has not discovered the value of life."

Charles Darwin

Some uses of models of quantitative genetic selection in social science

Some uses of models of quantitative genetic selection in social science
Michael D. Weight and Henry Harpending (2016)


Abstract

The theory of selection of quantitative traits is widely used in evolutionary biology, agriculture and other related fields. The fundamental model known as the breeder’s equation is simple, robust over short time scales, and it is often possible to estimate plausible parameters. In this paper it is suggested that the results of this model provide useful yardsticks for the description of social traits and the evaluation of transmission models. The differences on a standard personality test between samples of Old Order Amish and Indiana rural young men from the same county and the decline of homicide in Medieval Europe are used as illustrative examples of the overall approach. It is shown that the decline of homicide is unremarkable under a threshold model while the differences between rural Amish and non-Amish young men are too large to be a plausible outcome of simple genetic selection in which assortative mating by affiliation is equivalent to truncation selection.

Replication of the association between general intelligence and the general factor of personality using the California Child Q-set

Replication of the association between general intelligence and the general factor of personality using the California Child Q-set

Curtis S. Dunkel, Tomas Cabeza de Baca

• • Intelligence May-June 2016

    Highlights

    •

    The association between the general factor of personality (GFP) and intelligence was tested.

    •

    The California Child Q-sort was used to measure personality.

    •

    A positive association between the GFP and intelligence was found.

    •

    The results replicate those of Dunkel (2013).

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    Abstract

    
    

    The purpose of this investigation was to test the replicability of the positive correlation between a general factor of personality (GFP) derived from the California Child Q-set (CCQ) and general intelligence. Analyses were performed using data from two samples of children in which the participants were administered both a test of general cognitive ability and had their personality judged by raters using the CCQ. The results were consistent with previous results in which a positive correlation was found between the CCQ Big Five-based GFP and general intelligence. Future research should help to determine why GFPs derived from some measures correlate positively with general intelligence while GFPs derived from other measures do not.

A general intelligence factor in dogs

A general intelligence factor in dogs
Rosalind Arden & Mark James Adams
Intelligence March-April 2016

Highlights

•

The structure of cognitive abilities in dogs is similar to that found in people.

•

Dogs that solved problems more quickly were also more accurate.

•

Dogs' cognitive abilities can be tested quickly, like those of people.

•

Bigger individual differences studies on dog cognition will contribute to cognitive epidemiology.

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Abstract

Hundreds of studies have shown that, in people, cognitive abilities overlap yielding an underlying ‘g’ factor, which explains much of the variance. We assessed individual differences in cognitive abilities in 68 border collies to determine the structure of intelligence in dogs. We administered four configurations of a detour test and repeated trials of two choice tasks (point-following and quantity-discrimination). We used confirmatory factor analysis to test alternative models explaining test performance. The best-fitting model was a hierarchical model with three lower-order factors for the detour time, choice time, and choice score and a higher order factor; these accounted jointly for 68% of the variance in task scores. The higher order factor alone accounted for 17% of the variance. Dogs that quickly completed the detour tasks also tended to score highly on the choice tasks; this could be explained by a general intelligence factor. Learning about g in non human species is an essential component of developing a complete theory of g; this is feasible because testing cognitive abilities in other species does not depend on ecologically relevant tests. Discovering the place of g among fitness-bearing traits in other species will constitute a major advance in understanding the evolution of intelligence.

"Having one's face 'color' for social reasons is unique to humans[.]"

Cristopher Boehm

"it's all too human to be curious about beginnings"

>Anthropologists can assure us that ... in virtually any ethnographically described nonliterate society, people will be thinking deeply about questions of origins - be they of the physical world, of people, or of morals - and that they'll encourage rhetorically gifted specialists to tell them their origin stories from memory.<

Cristopher Boehm