Freitag, 27. März 2020

Disgust as a Mechanism for Decision Making Under Risk

https://meinnaturwissenschaftsblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/disgust-as-mechanism-for-decision.html

Extending the risk framework from pathogen disgust to sexual and moral disgust 

Other forms of disgust do not demonstrate an input-output logic consistent with a pathogen-avoidance function. For example, people often report feeling disgusted by incest or violent aggression, despite there being no clear connection between such behavior and pathogen harm. Natural selection generally proceeds by modifying existing traits to serve new ultimate functions. In some cases, the old trait is entirely transformed into the new trait; for example, the terrestrial quadruped’s forelimbs were transformed into the bat’s wings. In other cases, in what is termed serial homology, an existing trait is duplicated and the duplicate is modified, such that the organism possesses both the older, ancestral trait and the newer, derived trait; for example, the snake’s fangs are modified duplicates of its other teeth. It appears that some emotions constitute serial homologies, i.e., the functional features of one form of the emotion afforded repurposing to serve other ultimate functions even as the original form was retained. Pathogen disgust motivates avoidance and diminishes appetitive drive, features that made it well suited for repurposing to guide the individual away from other types of hazard. Hence, disgust responses to sexual stimuli or moral violators can be understood as serial homologues of pathogen disgust, duplicates in which the eliciting conditions have been importantly altered, and which operate in parallel with the original pathogen-avoidance functions of disgust (Clark, 2010). Importantly, like pathogen disgust, these subsidiary forms operate in domains in which costs and benefit tradeoffs must be regulated. Correspondingly, considerations of decision-making under risk continue to apply in these areas as well.

....

Moral disgust motivates avoiding those who violate social norms, perhaps protecting the morally-disgusted individual from direct harm by the violator and/or from stigma-by-association (Neuberg et al. 1994) and higher-order punishment (punishment meted out to those who fail to punish norm violators – Kelly 2011; Clark & Fessler 2014). Whenever this cost mitigation also sacrifices benefits, such as from cooperation with norm violators, moral disgust too can be seen as a riskavoidance strategy."

Keine Kommentare:

Kommentar veröffentlichen