John S. Price, Russell Gardner Jr., Mark Erickson (2004)
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we view escalation and de-escalation as alternative agonistic strategies that result in normal communicative behavioral states but at times manifest as mania and depression, respectively (Gardner, 1982, 1988). We suggest that the three levels of the triune forebrain (MacLean, 1990) each independently choose between escalation (fight) and de-escalation (flight or submission).
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Our theory holds that patients suffering from depression, anxiety, and co-morbid conditions such as fatigue states and somatization disorders communicate to fellow human beings non-combatant status for whatever form of social competition the society uses. When such communication occurs in nonhuman animals, the label of ‘‘appeasement (or submissive) display’’ indicates it functions to switch off the aggression of the rival. It says, ‘‘I am no threat to you, I will not retaliate.’’
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Cannon (1929) first pointed out that organisms do not run at full steam all the time, but that great reserves of energy can be called on when a situation demands.
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Escalation refers to a switch to a more expensive form of competition; when an individual escalates, the chances of winning increase but the potential costs of losing also increase. In de-escalation, the individual gives up any chance of winning, but reduces the costs of losing. De-escalation may take the form of departure, but in group-living animals submission with appeasement display represents the more common form of de-escalation.
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In line with the complexity of social competition, escalation and de-escalation became more complex over the course of evolution. For instance, these behaviors may have become more prolonged: instead of a rapid choice between fight and flight, an interpersonal struggle for dominance may last several months, even in chimpanzees (deWaal, 1989). And in humans, for whom competition for prestige has largely replaced agonistic competition (Gilbert, 1992; Stevens and Price, 2000, pp. 51 – 52, 159 – 160), escalation may take the form of the vigorous pursuit of goals, whereas de-escalation may take the form of giving up goals.
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At the instinctive level, we hypothesize that escalation in the reptilian brain takes the form of elevated mood, giving the individual a prolonged increase in energy, optimism, self-confidence and heightened sociability all of which function to recruit allies. Conversely, de-escalation at the instinctive level takes the form of depressed mood and may include unfocused anxiety, fatigue and a sense of physical disability. The appeasement display at this level communicates this impairment and disability to any rival or to society as a whole. Parenthetically, when directed at friends and allies, the appeasement display takes the form of a distress signal, sending the message, ‘‘I am sick, care for me, and do not send me into the arena to fight on your behalf’’ (Price and Gardner, 1995).
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Normally, a person directs submission to one or more individuals, for example, to a leader, a parent, or God. This applies to the appeasement display of the rational neocortical level. But the depressed patient, communicating at the reptilian level, makes a non-directed, general communication of submissive incapacity.
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Whereas a depressed manager appears to ‘‘go quiet’’ to his superiors, for example, his underlings may find him irritable or downright aggressive.
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Indeed, part of the effectiveness of the depressive reaction as a form of submission stems from the conviction that things will not get better or even that they should not get better. The lack of hope of, or desire for, recovery, exhibits ‘‘design’’ features. It communicates no preparation whatsoever for a ‘‘come-back.’’ Depressed patients therefore display high motivation to refuse treatment.
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Depressed emotion contrasts with depressed mood (Davidson and Ekman, 1994) in that it has an object, i.e., one is depressed about something, and if the situation changes for the better, one cheers up; also, depressed emotion feels less pervasive than depressed mood does. Champion and Power (1995) suggest that depressed emotion functions to help one to abandon unrealistic goals, and Watson and Andrews (in press) argue that it fosters change from a depressing niche to a more satisfactory one.
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[It's of importance to distinguish] between depressed emotion and depressed mood. Although subjectively and even objectively similar, the two levels of de-escalation have different aims; depressed emotion functions to regulate the individual’s goal choice and niche selection; depressed mood on the other hand functions to transfer goal pursuit from the depressed individual to a rival; both depressed emotion and depressed mood facilitate de-escalation at the rational level, and if this occurs, conflict resolution likely results.
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depressed mood commonly produces depressive thinking such as pessimism, low self-esteem, a reduced sense of entitlement, and the feeling that things are not worth fighting for;
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The zoologist who first described social hierarchy (Schjelderup-Ebbe, 1935) noted two distinct types of depression in the domestic hen, a severe depression in a deposed alpha bird, and a chronic sense of ‘‘hopelessness’’ in the low ranking bird.
For both change and homeostatic depression appeasement functions similarly; therefore, manifest impairment of function, and the expression of pessimistic ideas about the self, the world and the future, represent expressions appropriate for both. On the other hand, the theory predicts different ideas about the past. The ‘‘change’’ depressive formerly possessed higher rank and he might aspire to regain it; but if delusional distortion of the past holds center stage, the patient may deny ever having had higher rank, honours or wealth; the person subjectively feels nothing exists to regain. This means a lessened likelihood of attempted comeback; the appeasement function of depression would therefore have worked more effectively. The homeostatic depressive, on the other hand, never had higher rank, and so depressive delusions about the past would have no function.
Another difference between the two types of depression shows up in the accounts of relatives and friends. Relatives of the ‘‘change’’ depressive tend to notice a change of personality and make comments such as, ‘‘He just isn’t the man I married’’, whereas the relatives of the ‘‘homeostatic’’ depressive notice little change, making comments such as, ‘‘He’s much the same as always, only more so.’’
-----
we view escalation and de-escalation as alternative agonistic strategies that result in normal communicative behavioral states but at times manifest as mania and depression, respectively (Gardner, 1982, 1988). We suggest that the three levels of the triune forebrain (MacLean, 1990) each independently choose between escalation (fight) and de-escalation (flight or submission).
-----
Our theory holds that patients suffering from depression, anxiety, and co-morbid conditions such as fatigue states and somatization disorders communicate to fellow human beings non-combatant status for whatever form of social competition the society uses. When such communication occurs in nonhuman animals, the label of ‘‘appeasement (or submissive) display’’ indicates it functions to switch off the aggression of the rival. It says, ‘‘I am no threat to you, I will not retaliate.’’
-----
Cannon (1929) first pointed out that organisms do not run at full steam all the time, but that great reserves of energy can be called on when a situation demands.
-----
Escalation refers to a switch to a more expensive form of competition; when an individual escalates, the chances of winning increase but the potential costs of losing also increase. In de-escalation, the individual gives up any chance of winning, but reduces the costs of losing. De-escalation may take the form of departure, but in group-living animals submission with appeasement display represents the more common form of de-escalation.
-----
In line with the complexity of social competition, escalation and de-escalation became more complex over the course of evolution. For instance, these behaviors may have become more prolonged: instead of a rapid choice between fight and flight, an interpersonal struggle for dominance may last several months, even in chimpanzees (deWaal, 1989). And in humans, for whom competition for prestige has largely replaced agonistic competition (Gilbert, 1992; Stevens and Price, 2000, pp. 51 – 52, 159 – 160), escalation may take the form of the vigorous pursuit of goals, whereas de-escalation may take the form of giving up goals.
-----
At the instinctive level, we hypothesize that escalation in the reptilian brain takes the form of elevated mood, giving the individual a prolonged increase in energy, optimism, self-confidence and heightened sociability all of which function to recruit allies. Conversely, de-escalation at the instinctive level takes the form of depressed mood and may include unfocused anxiety, fatigue and a sense of physical disability. The appeasement display at this level communicates this impairment and disability to any rival or to society as a whole. Parenthetically, when directed at friends and allies, the appeasement display takes the form of a distress signal, sending the message, ‘‘I am sick, care for me, and do not send me into the arena to fight on your behalf’’ (Price and Gardner, 1995).
-----
Normally, a person directs submission to one or more individuals, for example, to a leader, a parent, or God. This applies to the appeasement display of the rational neocortical level. But the depressed patient, communicating at the reptilian level, makes a non-directed, general communication of submissive incapacity.
-----
Whereas a depressed manager appears to ‘‘go quiet’’ to his superiors, for example, his underlings may find him irritable or downright aggressive.
-----
Indeed, part of the effectiveness of the depressive reaction as a form of submission stems from the conviction that things will not get better or even that they should not get better. The lack of hope of, or desire for, recovery, exhibits ‘‘design’’ features. It communicates no preparation whatsoever for a ‘‘come-back.’’ Depressed patients therefore display high motivation to refuse treatment.
-----
Depressed emotion contrasts with depressed mood (Davidson and Ekman, 1994) in that it has an object, i.e., one is depressed about something, and if the situation changes for the better, one cheers up; also, depressed emotion feels less pervasive than depressed mood does. Champion and Power (1995) suggest that depressed emotion functions to help one to abandon unrealistic goals, and Watson and Andrews (in press) argue that it fosters change from a depressing niche to a more satisfactory one.
-----
[It's of importance to distinguish] between depressed emotion and depressed mood. Although subjectively and even objectively similar, the two levels of de-escalation have different aims; depressed emotion functions to regulate the individual’s goal choice and niche selection; depressed mood on the other hand functions to transfer goal pursuit from the depressed individual to a rival; both depressed emotion and depressed mood facilitate de-escalation at the rational level, and if this occurs, conflict resolution likely results.
-----
depressed mood commonly produces depressive thinking such as pessimism, low self-esteem, a reduced sense of entitlement, and the feeling that things are not worth fighting for;
-----
The zoologist who first described social hierarchy (Schjelderup-Ebbe, 1935) noted two distinct types of depression in the domestic hen, a severe depression in a deposed alpha bird, and a chronic sense of ‘‘hopelessness’’ in the low ranking bird.
For both change and homeostatic depression appeasement functions similarly; therefore, manifest impairment of function, and the expression of pessimistic ideas about the self, the world and the future, represent expressions appropriate for both. On the other hand, the theory predicts different ideas about the past. The ‘‘change’’ depressive formerly possessed higher rank and he might aspire to regain it; but if delusional distortion of the past holds center stage, the patient may deny ever having had higher rank, honours or wealth; the person subjectively feels nothing exists to regain. This means a lessened likelihood of attempted comeback; the appeasement function of depression would therefore have worked more effectively. The homeostatic depressive, on the other hand, never had higher rank, and so depressive delusions about the past would have no function.
Another difference between the two types of depression shows up in the accounts of relatives and friends. Relatives of the ‘‘change’’ depressive tend to notice a change of personality and make comments such as, ‘‘He just isn’t the man I married’’, whereas the relatives of the ‘‘homeostatic’’ depressive notice little change, making comments such as, ‘‘He’s much the same as always, only more so.’’
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