When is it good to believe bad things?

Commentary on McKay & Dennett 

 

Abstract: 56 words 

Main text: 988 words 

References: 724 words 

Total text: 1768 words 

 

When is it good to believe bad things? 

 

Joshua M. Ackerman 

Sloan School of Management 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

1 Amherst St., E40 

Cambridge, MA 02142 

USA 

Tel: 617-258-9102 

joshack@mit.edu 

http://web.mit.edu/joshack/www/ 

 

Jenessa R. Shapiro 

Department of Psychology 

University of California, Los Angeles 

Box 951563 

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563 

USA 

jshapiro@psych.ucla.edu 

 

Jon K. Maner 

Department of Psychology 

Florida State University 

1107 W. Call Street 

Tallahassee, FL 32306-4301 

USA 

maner@psy.fsu.edu 

http://www.psy.fsu.edu/faculty/maner.dp.html 

 

 

Abstract:  

Positive and negative misbeliefs both may have evolved to serve important adaptive 

functions. Here, we focus on the role of negative misbeliefs in promoting adaptive 

outcomes within the contexts of romantic relationships and intergroup interactions. 

Believing bad things can paradoxically encourage romantic fidelity, personal safety, 

competitive success and group solidarity, as well as other positive outcomes.  

 

 

 

In their article, McKay and Dennett define evolved misbeliefs, or illusions, as those that 

are adaptively superior to fully accurate beliefs. The authors focus their discussion on the 

value of positive misbeliefs, but there are also reasons to believe that negative misbeliefs 

can serve adaptive functions as well. Below, we consider negative misbeliefs within two 

important social contexts: (1) close relationships and (2) intergroup interactions. 

 

Misbeliefs related to close relationships 

 

The formation and maintenance of close relationships are fundamental human pursuits 

(Ackerman & Kenrick, 2008; Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, in press). 

Romantic relationships are particularly important because mating represents the sine qua 

non of evolutionary success. Positive misbeliefs may aid these romantic pursuits, as in 

McKay and Dennett's example of the over-perception of positive spousal attributes. 

However, close relationships may also benefit from negative illusions. For instance, 

women tend to believe that men are less interested in romantic commitment than those 

men actually are (Haselton & Buss, 2000), especially prior to the onset of sexual activity 

in relationships (Ackerman, Griskevicius, & Li, 2009). McKay and Dennett suggest that, 

although the system that generates such misbeliefs is probably adaptive, misbeliefs 

themselves are not (because accurate beliefs would be equally protective without 

suffering from false positive errors). However, underestimating male commitment could 

lead women to set higher thresholds for suitors to overcome, leading men to expend 

greater effort and investment (see Ackerman & Kenrick, in press), and ultimately 

boosting the romantic returns that women receive (e.g., mate quality, economic resources, 

actual commitment). Conversely, accurate beliefs about potential romantic partners might 

facilitate accurate decision making, but would be unlikely to garner these additional 

benefits. 

 

Another example pertains to misbeliefs about alternative relationship partners. People in 

committed relationships tend to display cognitive biases that inhibit straying from those 

relationships (e.g., Maner, Gailliot, & Miller, 2009; Maner, Rouby, & Gonzaga, 2008), 

such as believing that attractive relationship alternatives are less appealing than they 

actually are (Johnson & Rusbult, 1989; Simpson, Gangestad, & Lerma, 1990). These 

negative illusions down-regulate threats posed by romantic alternatives, increasing the 

long-term success of one's current relationship. Long-term romantic relationships serve 

important functions linked to social affiliation and offspring care, as well as the more 

obvious reproductive benefits, and thus negative misbeliefs about relationship 

alternatives can promote a range of adaptive outcomes. Accurate beliefs about attractive 

alternatives, however, could promote infidelity and destabilize one's relationship.   

 

Misbeliefs related to intergroup interactions 

 

In addition to romantic relationships, group-level relationships are also fundamental 

components of human evolutionary success (Kenrick et al., in press; Neuberg & Cottrell, 

2006). Throughout human evolutionary history, hostile outgroups have posed threats to 

personal safety and group resources. Many of these threats were transient, with periods of 

conflict interspersed with periods of relative peace (e.g., Baer & McEachron, 1982). 

Accurate beliefs acknowledging that outgroups were not always threatening could have 

supported increased intergroup contact. However, the potential for threat in intergroup 

interactions would likely remain high, as initially peaceful or cooperative encounters 

between unfamiliar parties can quickly turn dangerous (e.g., through simple 

misunderstandings or signals of vulnerability). Negative outgroup illusions could have 

enhanced fitness to the extent that they led people to be wary, reducing the probability of 

loss or harm from a hostile outgroup member (see Ackerman et al., 2009).  

 

In fact, negative misbeliefs can strengthen the drive to compete with other groups for 

status and resources (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). For 

example, sports teams may perform better because of the misbeliefs they hold about the 

motivation and skill of their rivals. Similarly, religions may facilitate conversion by 

asserting the falsity and profaneness of other gods. In the political realm, nations are 

frequently in conflict with one another over natural and social resources, and exhibit 

extreme ideological and ethnocentric beliefs as a result (Campbell, 1965). Governments 

that construe other nations as ?Evil Empires? may be more motivated to economically 

out-produce and even attack those nations (thereby attaining resources, if they win). In 

contrast, accurate beliefs about opposing groups would provide no extra incentive to 

compete and might even de-motivate groups with relatively lower standing and abilities. 

 

Much of the work on negative misbeliefs and intergroup threat has explored the role of 

race as a heuristic cue to group membership. People tend to associate particular racial 

groups with specific threats (e.g., Black males with physical danger; Cottrell & Neuberg, 

2005), and these biases become especially strong in the presence of other threat-relevant 

cues (e.g., angry expressions). For example, people believe that neutrally expressive 

outgroup men are more threatening when seen in the context of other, angry outgroup 

men (Shapiro et al., in press); frightened people believe that outgroup men are more 

angry than they truly are (Maner et al., 2005); and pregnant women, whose fetuses are 

especially vulnerable early in development, exhibit greater ethnocentric beliefs during 

their first trimester (Navarrete, Fessler, & Eng, 2007). Such negative illusions could 

promote outgroup avoidance (see also Mortensen et al., in press) which, in evolutionary 

contexts, could have served important self-protective functions. 

 

Finally, misbeliefs about outgroup threat elicit not only outgroup avoidance, but also 

ingroup solidarity (Becker et al., 2009; Coser, 1956; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This 

solidarity provides a number of advantages. Consider that the pursuit of economic and 

physical resources is often a zero-sum game, and thus groups must manage their 

resources by discouraging exploitation from selfish members. Cooperation is one solution 

to potential intragroup conflict, and negative illusions about the dangers of other groups 

may improve cooperation by providing a common threat and promoting intragroup unity 

(e.g., Hammond & Axelrod, 2006; Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007).  

 

Conclusion 

 

Many negative misbeliefs continue to provide adaptive benefits in modern times, and yet 

may also result in detrimental social outcomes such as the perpetration of problematic 

stereotypes and prejudices. Despite such modern troubles, there is reason to believe that, 

as with positive misbeliefs, negative misbeliefs evolved to meet recurrent challenges in 

the ancestral world. 

 

 

 

 

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