Maria Miceli & Cristiano Castelfranchi
>Whereas anger, resentment and indignation are focused on the target's specific misbehavior,
moral contempt (as well as basic contempt) is primarily directed to the person because of his
or her “badbeing” (e.g., Bell, 2013). As remarked by Fischer (2011, p. 81), “the attribution of
blame is dispositional in the case of contempt, and situational in the case of anger”. When
one experiences anger (as well as resentment or indignation) against somebody, one can still
believe that “it is not like him/her” to behave in that way. Conversely, the contemner views
the target's behavior as a piece of evidence of the latter's ugly dispositions. The target's specific
action is viewed as “like him/her”.<
>As pointed out by Fischer (2011, p. 81), “we think we can still influence the ones we are angry at, whereas we have given up this hope in the case of contempt”. Unlike contempt, anger typically implies perceived control over the situation (e.g., Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).<
>As pointed out by Fischer (2011, p. 81), “we think we can still influence the ones we are angry at, whereas we have given up this hope in the case of contempt”. Unlike contempt, anger typically implies perceived control over the situation (e.g., Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).<
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