The Uptalk Epidemic

The Uptalk Epidemic

Das Verweilen beim Lernen:

Beim Lernen von Lernstoffen, macht es des öfteren Sinn, bei einzelnen Sachverhalten länger zu verweilen, und diesen eingehend Aufmerksamkeit zu widmen. Lernen lernen bedeutet schließlich auch verweilen lernen.

Im Sinne Nietzsche's:

>Sehen lernen - dem Auge die Ruhe, die Geduld, das An-sich-herankommen-lassen angewöhnen; das Urteil hinausschieben, den Einzelfall von allen Seiten umgehen und umfassen lernen. Das ist die erste Vorschulung der Geistigkeit: auf einen Reiz nicht sofort reagieren, sondern die hemmenden, die abschließenden Instinkte in die Hand bekommen. Sehen lernen, so wie ich es verstehe, ist beinahe Das, was die unphilosophische Sprechweise den starken Willen nennt: das Wesentliche daran ist gerade nicht "wollen", die Entscheidung aussetzen können. Alle Ungeistigkeit, alle Gemeinheit beruht auf dem Unvermögen, einem Reiz Widerstand zu leisten - man muss reagieren, man folgt jedem Impulse.<

Building Slowness:

"Building slowness allows space for executive function — planning, remembering, inhibiting impulses, and creativity — to grow. As psychiatrist Dr. Ed Hallowell says to children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD, “You have a Ferrari of a mind, and I’m a brake specialist. I am here to help you learn to apply the brakes." Meditation and cultivating deliberation — slow talking, slow reading, slow eating, not interrupting — all work. ... We need to know much more about how to build patience, an unfashionable but critical virtue."

Martin Seligman

Charles Darwin - Autobiographical Notes

From Darwin's Autobiography:

"I have no great quickness of apprehension or wit which is so remarkable in some clever men, for instance, Huxley. I am therefore a poor critic: a paper or book, when first read, generally excites my admiration, and it is only after considerable reflection that I perceive the weak points. My power to follow a long and purely abstract train of thought is very limited; and therefore I could never have succeeded with metaphysics or mathematics. My memory is extensive, yet hazy: it suffices to make me cautious by vaguely telling me that I have observed or read something opposed to the conclusion which I am drawing, or on the other hand in favour of it; and after a time I can generally recollect where to search for my authority. So poor in one sense is my memory, that I have never been able to remember for more than a few days a single date or a line of poetry.

Some of my critics have said, "Oh, he is a good observer, but he has no power of reasoning!" I do not think that this can be true, for the 'Origin of Species' is one long argument from the beginning to the end, and it has convinced not a few able men. No one could have written it without having some power of reasoning. I have a fair share of invention, and of common sense or judgment, such as every fairly successful lawyer or doctor must have, but not, I believe, in any higher degree.

On the favourable side of the balance, I think that I am superior to the common run of men in noticing things which easily escape attention, and in observing them carefully. My industry has been nearly as great as it could have been in the observation and collection of facts. What is far more important, my love of natural science has been steady and ardent.

This pure love has, however, been much aided by the ambition to be esteemed by my fellow naturalists. From my early youth I have had the strongest desire to understand or explain whatever I observed,—that is, to group all facts under some general laws. These causes combined have given me the patience to reflect or ponder for any number of years over any unexplained problem. As far as I can judge, I am not apt to follow blindly the lead of other men. I have steadily endeavoured to keep my mind free so as to give up any hypothesis, however much beloved (and I cannot resist forming one on every subject), as soon as facts are shown to be opposed to it. Indeed, I have had no choice but to act in this manner, for with the exception of the Coral Reefs, I cannot remember a single first-formed hypothesis which had not after a time to be given up or greatly modified. This has naturally led me to distrust greatly deductive reasoning in the mixed sciences. On the other hand, I am not very sceptical,—a frame of mind which I believe to be injurious to the progress of science. A good deal of scepticism in a scientific man is advisable to avoid much loss of time, for I have met with not a few men, who, I feel sure, have often thus been deterred from experiment or observations, which would have proved directly or indirectly serviceable."

"Some studies place the time horizon of nonhuman animals at just a few minutes; others allow that in some contexts, some animals might prospect as far as day (Roberts, 2002). Humans, in contrast, can readily mentally represent events and episodes that are days, years, decades, and indeed millennia in the future, long after they as individuals, or even as a species, will have perished. The time horizon of humans appears to be essentially boundless."

Homo Prospectus, Seligman et al.

Expertise und die Automatisierug von Abläufen:

"Was einen hervorragenden Bridge-Spieler oder eine hervorragende Chirurgin oder einen hervorragenden Piloten auszeichnet, ist, wie viele der jeweiligen Abläufe bei ihnen automatisiert sind."

Martin Seligman

General trust impedes perception of self-reported primary psychopathy in thin slices of social interaction

"Adaptive error management theory [36] suggests that people will generally overestimate the potential dangerousness of strangers (reviewed in [22]) because the costs of false alarms are lower than the costs of mistaken attributions of harmlessness. Individual differences in trade-offs between the costs of false alarms and misses (as defined in signal detection theory [37]) in this domain may be reflected in individual differences in general trust. In other words, judges low in general trust might overestimate the psychopathy levels of most target individuals, but make more accurate judgments than high-trusters with respect to targets who are high in psychopathic traits."

"More trusting people are worse than less trusting people at detecting psychopathy in others, in the sense that their judgments deviate more from the self-described psychopathy levels of people they encounter. However, because more trusting individuals are reluctant to attribute callousness, dishonesty or manipulativeness to others based on limited information, they can presumably better reap the benefits of mutually beneficial cooperation in some social ecologies without paying the costs of psychopathy detection (see [55])."

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